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Rumen Dobrinsky* 
The Small Private Sector in Bulgaria: Labour Market Impact and 
‘Grey Zone’ Activity 
1. Introduction 
The emerging new private sector and, in particular, the small private sector is the most 
dynamic part of all post-communist economies. It has contributed the most to the process 
of reallocation of resources in these economies and to the creation of new jobs. While 
being dynamic and vital, small private firms – as suggested by both analytical research and 
anecdotal evidence – often engage in informal activities which are not always properly 
reported in their books. In this context, this paper focuses on two main aspects of the 
evolution and performance of the small private sector in Bulgaria: 1) its effect on the 
Bulgarian labour market; 2) a tentative assessment of its “grey” business activity. 
 
The first part of the paper is devoted to an analysis of the impact of the small private sector 
on the Bulgarian labour market on the basis of empirical evidence of the small private 
firms’ labour market performance. Based on recent performance statistics from the 
available comprehensive enterprise dataset, we evaluate various types of job flows in the 
Bulgarian by sectors of economic activity, by types of firms and by regions and seek to 
identify the role of small private firms in the dynamics of these flows.  
 
The second part of the paper addresses one specific type of informal business activity 
which is mostly practiced by small private firms. We use the term “grey zone” to define 
economic activities that are actually performed by formally registered firms (over and 
above the formal part of their business) but, for various reasons (in the first place, tax 
evasion but also due to institutional bottlenecks), are not formally reported in the firms’ 
books.  In the paper we attempt an indirect evaluation of some of the “grey” activity of 
Bulgarian small private firms on the basis of the reported data for their formal activity.  
 
The main underlying hypothesis is that, due to tax evasion, small private firms likely 
underreport the level of the remuneration of their employees while wages actually paid are 
higher than those reported. As a result value added generated by these firms is also likely 
to be higher than reported. The tentative evaluation of the level wage/value added 
underreporting is made by applying different assumptions about wage formation in different 
types of firms such as: 1) wage equalization for employees with similar skills within 
economic sectors/branches; 2) similarity of cost structures (including share of labour costs 
in total costs) within economic sectors/branches; 3) similarity in the  pattern of wage 
                                                                 
*   The empirical work reported in this paper was performed by Nasko Dochev and Nikolay Markov from the Centre for 
Economic and Strategic Research. 2 
formation in firms characterised by similar governance structures. This allows to produce 
an alternative estimate of the actual value added produced contribution in the small private 
sector and its contribution to aggregate economic activity. 
 
 
2. The labour market impact of the small private sector in Bulgaria 
2.1. The small private sector and labour market adjustments in the transition 
from plan to market  
The newly emerging small private sector has been the most dynamic part of the central 
and eastern European countries undergoing economic and political transformation. Its 
dynamism has its roots in several important features of the process of transition from plan 
to market.  First of all, this segment of the business spectrum was virtually non-existent in 
most centrally planned economies as private entrepreneurship (with very few exceptions) 
was practically banned. Besides, central planners had no interest in small-sized firms; their 
attention was mostly focused on “prestigious” industrial giants which shaped the industrial 
structure. Given the fact that the potential demand for various goods and especially 
services that the small private sector can offer (and that these new market opportunities 
grew and diversified with the overall economic liberalization), the filling of this lacuna was a 
natural supply side response to the opening of market entry. 
 
Secondly, the mushrooming of the small private sector was part of the major restructuring 
and adjustment effort that the economies in transition economies had to undertake.  Due to 
the excessive emphasis of central planners on heavy industry, these economies inherited 
an oversized and obsolete manufacturing sector, structured around a relatively small 
number of large but inefficient firms.  The exposure to market conditions and competition 
revealed the non-viability of many such firms. Hence all transition economies were faced 
with the challenge of massive re-location of resources, in the first place, labour. For 
example, in Bulgaria, between 1989 and 2002 the number of the employed in industry 
(mining, manufacturing and utilities) dropped from 1646 ths. persons to 707 ths. persons, 
or by 57%! Hence the opening of a small business was also a survival strategy for many of 
those that lost their previous jobs. 
 
The importance of the small business sector as a catalyst of structural change and, in 
particular, as an important engine of re-location of labour is widely acknowledged in the 
literature (see, e.g. Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh, 1993). As evidenced by a number of 
studies, its role has been especially pronounced the countries undergoing transition from 
plan to market. Thus EBRD (1995) emphasizes the positive spillover effects (or 
externalities) generated by SMEs: they invigorate markets, encourage product and process 
innovation and stimulate competition in local markets.  
 3 
The small business sector has also been identified as one of the main sources of new jobs 
in the transition economies. On the one hand, the opening up of the local markets for the 
entry of small private firms provided opportunities for many skilled people to find alternative 
application of their skills, to improve their career prospects and, ultimately, to increase the 
return on their human capital. Intensive job-to-job shifts towards the private sector were 
typical of this process of massive re-allocation of labour. Thus, by analyzing job flows in a 
number of transition economies Boeri (1995) argues that small private firms in these 
countries tend to hire persons already employed  in other firms (in the beginning of 
transition, mostly from SOEs) and not from unemployment.  
 
On the other hand, the liberalization of market entry allowed many people who lost their 
previous jobs to start their own business and thus to take their fate in their own hands. 
While in this case some of the new entrepreneurs tried to enter a business with a similar 
profile to what they were doing in the past, mainly relying of accumulated knowledge and 
skills, others entered totally new business areas, seeking to expand and/or diversify their 
skills. Many of these firms, especially in the services sectors, are family businesses which 
provide labour opportunities mainly to the members of the owners’ family. 
 
While the importance of the new small private sector as a catalyst and engine of labour 
market adjustment has been widely acknowledged, relatively few studies have succeeded 
to provide an in-depth empirical analysis of the actual mechanisms and channels through 
which small firms participate in, and contribute to, the relocation of labour in the transition 
economies. One of the important obstacles for the implementation of this type of the 
analysis is the absence or the scarcity of relevant data. Obviously, matched employee-
employer data covering both firm performance and individual job flows would be the most 
comprehensive source for the purposes of such an analysis. However, comprehensive 
datasets of this sort (covering also the small private sector) are practically non-existent for 
most of the countries in transition. Among the very few studies using matched employee-
employer data, is that by Haltiwanger and Vodopivec (2003) who analyse worker and job 
flows in Slovenia and the interrelations of these flows with firms’ wage policies. They find 
that wage compression in firms (low average wages and/or low within-firm wage 
dispersion) tends to be associated with higher job volatility (both creation and destruction of 
jobs), especially for highly skilled workers. 
 
Due to the existing data constraints, most empirical studies in this area are based on either 
“employer only” (firm level data sets) or “employee only” (household surveys). However, 
even firm level data sets containing the relevant data for small-sized firms are not always 
readily available as most statistical offices monitor small firms only through surveys of 
representative samples; moreover, even these are often difficult to obtain for research 
purposes.  One of the few studies that are based on comprehensive data coverage of the 
small private sector is that by Konings, Lehmann and Schaffer (1996) which, however, 4 
contains only one data point (one year of observation) for the small private sector, 1991.  
Drawing from the empirical evidence, these authors emphasize the role of de novo private 
firms in generating new jobs during the recession years at the start of transition in Poland.  
Most of the firm-level studies devoted to the relocation of labour during the transition 
exclude small firms due to the absence of relevant data for this category of firms. Thus 
Faggio and Konings (2003) who analyse in detail job flows in five transition economies 
(Poland, Estonia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania) are only concerned with medium-sized 
and large firms, the types of firms reported in the AMADEUS dataset. 
 
Other labour market studies devoted to the small private sector have attempted to 
overcome this difficulty by analysing the labour market behaviour of individuals on the 
basis of household survey data. Using this type of worker-level data in their assessment of 
job relocation in the Czech Republic and Estonia, Jurajda and Terrell (2002, 2003), provide 
important insights into the motivation and driving forces of jobs flows in the two countries. 
The analytical focus of these studies is on the labour market impact of start-up private 
companies and one of the central findings of Jurajda and Terrell is that de novo private 
firms indeed generated more jobs in these countries than large old firms which existed 
prior to 1990. Another interesting finding is that job growth within industries in the Czech 
Republic and Estonia was quantitatively more important than job growth due to across-
industry relocation. Using a similar data set, Haltiwanger and Vodopivec (2002) analyse job 
creation and destruction in the private and public sector in Estonia and find that job flows 
were higher for small private firms; besides the relocation of labour differed across sectors 
of economic activity and was most intensive in some services industries. In general, while 
providing important insights into some key aspects of the process of labour relocation, the 
studies based on household survey data stop short of capturing the importance of firm 
performance as a determinant of job and worker flows. 
 
 
2.2. Worker flows in the Bulgarian corporate sectors and the role of the small 
private sector  
Similarly to developments in other post-communist economies, the newly emerging small 
private sector has been the most dynamic part of the Bulgarian economy since the start of 
economic and political transformation. In this section we look at some of the performance 
characteristics of the small private sector, focusing on its labour market impact, in 
particular, worker flows. In the context of the categorization of research in this area outlined 
above, it falls into the first category, i.e. it is based on “employer-only” data. However, 
compared to other similar studies its coverage is considerably broader, as it covers the 
greater part of the existing small private firms in Bulgaria. 
 
For this study we use a comprehensive enterprise dataset for Bulgarian firms which has 
been compiled at the Centre for Economic and Strategic Research in Sofia. It covers 5 
practically all incorporated firms that report to the National Statistical Institute in accordance 
with the double-entry accounting method.
1 What is missing from the small private sector in 
this dataset are individual entrepreneurs and partnerships which are not required to 
maintain their books in accordance with the double-entry accounting method. However, 
this category of firms has a relatively small weight in the Bulgarian economy and hence our 
coverage can be regarded as quite comprehensive.
2 
 
It should also be noted that due to the specificity of the source data provided by the 
National Statistical Institute, not all of the available firm-level entries can be used in the 
analysis of dynamic performance characteristics.
3 Due to this we distinguish between two 
definitions of our sample: 1) the “full sample” which covers all individual firm-level data 
entries for each specific year; 2) an “operational sample” which contains dynamically linked 
data, i.e. firms that can be traced at least in two adjacent years which allows to analyse 
their dynamic performance characteristics. Some of the firm performance characteristics 
presented below (in particular, the dynamic characteristics) are based on the operational 
subsample. 
 
Tables 1 to 3 present an overview of the population of firms comprising the Bulgarian 
corporate sector in the period 1995-2001. It also shows the evolution and role of the small 
private sector in this period, focusing on its labour market effect as reflected in some basic 
employment characteristics.  For the purposes of this assessment, the data are organized 
in three different breakdowns:  
1)  By sectors of economic activity (in this case, by the NACE one-digit sections). 
2)  By size and ownership categories. We have introduced six categories of firms 
which allow to trace both the ownership transformation and the role of the small 
private firms: 
-  state-owned firms (SOEs); 
-  Firms privatized to domestic investors; 
-  Domestically controlled de novo private firms with 20 or more employees; 
-  Foreign controlled firms with 20 or more employees; 
-  Domestically controlled de novo private firms with less than 20 employees; 
-  Foreign controlled private firms with less than 20 employees. 
                                                                 
1   In accordance with the acting legislation, all incorporated entities are required to apply the double entry accounting 
method and are mandated to provide their annual statements to the National Statistical Institute for statistical purposes.  
2   For example, for 2001 the small firms in our sample accounted for some 85% of the total employment of all small firms 
(including individual entrepreneurs) and for some 90% of the total sales of small firms. 
3   In accordance with the Law on Statistics, the Bulgarian National Statistical Institute only provides to outside users 
unidentified data for specific data points (years). However, the analysis of dynamic performance characteristics requires 
time series for individual entities (firms). As the individual entities are not disclosed in the original dataset, the dynamic 
linking can only be performed through indirect methods, e.g. comparing the same indicators reported in adjacent years 
(beginning-of-the-year and end-of-the-year values). This is an extremely difficult and cumbersome task which due to 
numerous practical difficulties, precludes a complete dynamic linkage of the frirms. 6 
-  For the purposes of this study we have defined the new small private sector in 
Bulgaria as the sum of the last two categories of firms. 
3)  By region (in this case, based on the latest administrative division of the country 
which is broken down into seven major regions). 
 
(Tables 1 to 3 here) 
 
Table 1 and 2 confirm the rapid development of the new small private sector and its 
increasing role in the Bulgarian economy: between 1995 and 2001 its share in total 
employment increased from 3.3% to 18.4% (table 2). The rapid pace of privatization in this 
period is also illustrated by the dynamics of the share of SOEs in total employment: it 
dropped from some 78.5% in 1995 to 25.7% in 2001.
4 The statistics on the average 
number of employed persons in different types of firms (table 3) suggest that by 2001, new 
small private firms prevailed in many sectors of economic activity (agriculture, fishing, 
trade, construction, hotels and restaurants, real estate).  
 
Tables 4 to 6 illustrate some features of job flows in the Bulgarian corporate sector as well 
as of the labour market impact of the Bulgarian new small private sector. These tables are 
computed on the basis of the operational sample only. 
 
The intensity of job flows for firms in different sectors and for different ownership/size 
categories of firms is reflected in the rates of gross job creation and job destruction (table 
4). The following definitions are used for this purpose. A firm is defined as a net job creator 
in year t if its average annual number of employees in year t is greater than the average 
number of employees in year t-1. In the opposite case it is a net destroyer of jobs. The 
gross job creation within a certain category of firms is defined as the sum of jobs created in 
job-creating firms; accordingly, gross job destruction is defined as the sum of jobs 
destroyed in job-destroying firms. The rates of gross job creation and destruction shown in 
table 4 are computed as the ratios between gross job creation (respectively, gross job 
destruction) in year t and the total number of employees in year t-1, for each category of 
firms. 
 
Table 4 represents the rates of gross job creation and job destruction for the various 
categories of firms used in this study (by sectors of economic activity, by ownership 
categories and by region).  It should be noted that this table only refers to worker flows in 
                                                                 
4   The privatized firms to domestic investors are probably the most severely under-represented in the operational sample: 
their share drops from 13% in 1997 to low single digits thereafter due to difficulties in dynamic linking. These difficulties 
are partly due to the fact that many privatized firms underwent substantial subsequent organizational changes which 
prevents their further identification as privatized entities. 7 
“existing” or “surviving” firms, i.e. firms that are present in our dataset for two adjacent 
years (both start-ups and firms that exit the market are excluded from this assessment).
5  
 
(Table 4 here) 
 
The magnitude of the rates of gross job creation and destruction in existing firms is 
indicative of the considerable volatility of the Bulgarian job market. The sum of (the 
absolute values of) the two rates actually reflects the rate of total job “shifts” within each 
category of firms; the numbers presented in the table suggest that each year in the period 
1995-2001 between 10% and almost 30% in some years of all formal jobs in the corporate 
sector shifted from one firm to another, or to non-existence. Among ownership categories, 
gross job destruction was the most intensive in small-sized firms and in privatized firms 
(especially in the years 1995-1996). Gross job destruction in SOEs was uneven which 
probably reflects the uneven process of restructuring of these firms: while at the beginning 
of the period job destruction in SOEs was not very pronounced, it soared after 1997 with 
the advance of some special restructuring and reorganization programs.
6  The rate of job 
destruction has been the lowest in large foreign controlled firms, which, on the one hand, 
suggests that jobs created in such firms tend to be more stable and, on the other hand, 
may be related to more rigorous human resource policies in such firms. While there was 
also considerable variation in job destruction across sectors of economies activity, the 
variation across regions was much less pronounced. 
 
Gross job creation in Bulgarian firms has been no less dynamic but until 2001 gross job 
creation in the corporate sector as a whole fell short of gross job destruction. According to 
our results, foreign controlled and larger de novo domestically owned private firms have 
contributed the most to gross job creation in this period.  These were also the categories of 
firms where the rates of gross job creation more often than not exceeded those of job 
destruction (this was especially pronounced in foreign controlled large firms). Not 
surprisingly, the rate of job creation was the lowest in SOEs (with the exception of the year 
2001 when most probably there were some job-to-job flows within the state-owned sector). 
It could also be noted that, in contrast to job destruction, there was significant intra-regional 
variation in job creation, with the capital Sofia emerging as the clear leader among other 
regions in recent years. 
 
                                                                 
5  This assessment may be incomplete as, due to the identification problems outlined above, it is sometimes difficult to 
trace the dynamic performance of firms in our dataset.  In particular, the identification of market exits is especially 
problematic, as often firms are re-organized and then appear in different forms in later years. For the same reasons the 
identification of medium- or large start-up firms is also problematic, as they may be mixed up with spin-offs or re-
organized firms. Among market entries, only small-sized start-up firms are relatively easy to trace in the dataset. 
6   After the major economic crisis in 1996-1997 and the introduction of a currency board in 1997, the process of market 
reforms (including enterprise restructuring) in Bulgaria was stepped up considerably.  8 
Table 4 also provides evidence of the high instability – as well as dynamism – of jobs in 
small private firms: both the rates of job creation and destruction for this category of firms 
were considerably higher than those in larger firms. One of the unusual results is that the 
rates of job destruction in existing small private firms as a rule exceeded considerably the 
rates of job creation. Most likely this outcome is related to the very low survival rate of small 
Bulgarian firms. While, in principle, low survival is a general feature of small firms in all 
economies, the extent to which this was happening in Bulgaria is probably unusual. 
 
Table 5 presents further evidence of the considerable turbulence prevailing in the 
Bulgarian job market in this period, and of the incidence of intensive and continuing 
massive job flows. The data presented in this table reflect the share of firms with growing 
employment over two consecutive years. Again, similarly to table 4, these results are 
based on the subset of “existing” or “surviving” firms, i.e. firms that are present in our 
dataset for two adjacent years. Looked from a different angle, the numbers in table 5 
reflect the capacity of existing firms to generate stable jobs. As a general feature, these 
data confirm that jobs in the Bulgarian corporate sector were extremely volatile and that 
there was a very high degree of turnover of personnel. The generally fairly low shares of 
firms with growing employment levels also reflect a persistently low labour demand in the 
Bulgarian corporate sector. Notably, in the initial years of this period there was a 
considerable cross-sectoral variation in the capacity of firms to create stable jobs; however, 
over time this variation across sectors decreased substantially. 
 
(Table 5 here) 
 
Table 5 highlights once again the importance of large foreign controlled firms in the 
generation of stable new jobs: the share of such firms with growing employment in all years 
between 1995 and 2001 was considerably higher than for any other category of firms. 
Firms privatized to domestic investors and large de novo domestically owned private firms 
were ranked second and third in terms of the generation of stable new jobs whereas small 
foreign-controlled firms did not differ substantially in this characteristics from small 
domestically controlled private firms.  For the corporate sector as a whole the share of 
firms with growing employment dropped considerably in 1997 (in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis) but has recovered thereafter. 
 
Table 6 is specifically designed to capture the job creating effect of start-up small private 
firms. As already noted, due to the identification problems in our dataset, this is probably 
the only category of market entry which is relatively easy to detect and identify. The data 
presented in this table highlight another striking feature of the Bulgarian job market: start-
up businesses played an extremely important role as generators of employment in this 
period. In the initial years of the observed period (1995 and 1996) jobs in start-up 
companies accounted for some 45%-50% of all jobs in small private firms! Later this share 9 
gradually declined but still remained quite significant. Notably, the cross-sector variation in 
this indicator was considerable, with start-up activity retaining greater importance in some 
services sectors as compared to agriculture and industry. 
 
(Table 6 here) 
 
 
3. An assessment of some “grey zone” activities of Bulgarian small private firms 
3.1 Conceptual background  
The existence of a business sector outside the official economic system is a well 
established and widespread phenomenon which exists in all types of economies.  At the 
same time, the notion of informal (unofficial, hidden, shadow, unobserved, etc.) economic 
activity is very broad and there are no established definitions of its coverage. When 
introduced by Hart (1970), it was used to broadly denote self-employed persons in 
developing economies. Later the notion was refined and narrowed somewhat in order to 
define real life economic activities (such that contribute to GDP) but do not comply with 
government regulations and do not pay taxes (Gerxhani, 1999; Ihrig and Moe, 2001; 
Schneider, 2002). A distinction is also usually made between informal and illegal economic 
activity: the first category may include activities that in principle, if registered, can be 
performed legally in the formal economy while the second category usually refers to 
business undertakings that are forbidden by law. The illegal economy is thus only one part 
of the informal sector. 
 
While the informal sector of the economy is generally not directly covered by the official 
statistics, it may produce observable outcomes that fall into the categories of economic 
results scrutinized by the official statistics. One obvious example is the situation when the 
income generated in the informal economy is used for the purchase of goods and services 
in the formal economy. To the extent possible, national statistical offices make adjustments 
to the national accounts to take into account the existence of the informal sector of the 
economy. 
 
On the basis of a survey of national statistical practices of measuring the size of the 
informal economy, the UN Economic Commission for Europe has suggested several 
concepts and definitions related to this type of business activity (UNECE, 2003).  The 
broadest concept coined in that publication is that of the “non-observed economy” which 
refers to all productive activities that are not captured in the source data used for the 
compilation of the national accounts. The non-observed economy is assumed to comprise 
three main components: “underground production” (activities that are legal by their nature 
but are concealed for tax evasion purposes); “informal activities” (legal production activities 
characterized by low level of organization, typically based on unofficial relationships); 10 
“illegal activities” (those banned by law or illegal when performed by unauthorized 
persons). 
 
While the conceptual framework dealing with informal economic activity is still rather vague 
and ambiguous, there is much less disagreement in the literature on the driving forces or 
determinants of this type of business activity. Four main groups of incentives have been 
identified as explaining the motivation of informal business undertakings (Johnson, 
McMillan and Woodruff, 2000): 1) to avoid paying taxes (this is the number one factor 
pinpointed by most authors writing about the informal economy); 2) to avoid paying 
kickbacks (which is also a sort of a tax) to corrupt, bribe-seeking government officials; 3) to 
hide some output in order to escape extortion by criminal gangs (the latter, as an illegal 
activity, also being part of the informal e conomy); 4) to circumvent existing institutional 
bottlenecks (e.g., if legal enforcement of contracts is inefficient, agents have few incentives 
to register their business). 
 
In this paper we deal with one specific type of informal business activity that we have 
named the “grey zone” economy. It is conventionally assumed that there is a clear 
distinction between “formal” economic activities (those that are properly registered and 
recorded, and pay their taxes) and “informal” ones (those that do nothing of the above).  By 
contrast, based on the available evidence, we assume in this paper that there may be a 
“grey” sector of the economy, which is somewhere between the strictly formal and strictly 
informal parts of the economy.  We use the term “grey zone” to define economic activities 
that are actually performed by formally registered firms (as a complement to the formal part 
of their business) but, for various reasons (in the first place, tax evasion but also due to 
institutional bottlenecks), are not formally reported in the firms’ books.  
 
With respect to the business activity of Bulgarian corporate entities, our main “suspicion” 
about grey zone activity falls on the underreporting of wages by small private firms. A first 
piece of hard evidence in support of this suspicion is the actual statistics about the level of 
formally paid wages in the Bulgarian corporate sector (table 7). A visual inspection of the 
data presented in this table indicates that average wages paid in domestically controlled 
small private firms after 1997 are ways below the average wages paid in other categories 
of firms.  
 
(Table 7 here) 
 
In principle there can be different explanations or interpretations of this differential.  One 
possible factor could be productivity: if wages are related to firms’ productivity then 
productivity differentials may give rise to wage differentials. Hence if small firms are less 
productive than larger firms, then the wage differential may be merely a reflection of this 
gap. However, the actual data on the productivity performance of different categories firms 11 
(table 8) does not seem to support this conjecture: on average small domestically 
controlled firms in Bulgaria are more productive than the sample average.  
 
(Table 8 here) 
 
Another possible explanation of the wage gap could be that the drop in the relative wages 
in small private forms recorded after 1996 was in response to the recession after the 1996-
1997 financial crisis: these firms were most sensitive to the drop in final domestic demand 
and responded by restraining relative wages in order to reduce costs and maintain their 
profit margins. While such type of an adjustment probably did take place, it seems unlikely 
that it alone can explain the extremely low relative wages in small private firms. 
 
Yet a third (preferred by us) explanation is that this drop was in response to the changes in 
payroll taxes in a situation of a weak institutional environment. Payroll taxes such as 
compulsory social security contributions have been progressively increasing in Bulgaria but 
the most significant changes took place in 1997-1998 with the complete overhaul of the 
social security system.  These included a full-scale reform of the pension system aiming at 
the introduction of a three-pillar pension system; one of the centrepieces of this reform was 
the creation of a National Insurance Institute (first pillar) and the adoption of legislation for 
the establishment of private pension funds (second mandatory pillar). There was a 
complete overhaul in health care with the goal  of establishing a fully-funded and self-
sufficient health care system. The reform measures included the establishment of a Health 
Insurance Fund and the commercialization (subsequent privatization is envisaged) of 
health services. Other components of the social security system were also reorganized. All 
these reforms resulted in raising the level of statutory payroll taxes. At the same time, the 
institutional environment in Bulgaria remained weak; in particular, contract enforcement 
through the judiciary system is still rather inefficient which, as noted, reduces the incentives 
to perform business in the formal economy and creates a conducive environment for tax 
evasion. 
 
Widely reported anecdotal evidence suggests that due to the perceived high level of 
taxation of labour costs, a large number of firms (mostly small private ones) seem to be 
formally paying to their employees the minimum wage only; accordingly, they use this low 
basis also to make their contributions to the social security system. Another portion of the 
actual remuneration apparently is being paid in the shadow economy thus avoiding 
taxation (both income and payroll taxes).  
 
Why should mostly small firms engage in this type of activity? One of the important 
reasons is governance, namely, the combination of ownership and control. As owners of 
small firms are at the same time their managers, they have the strongest incentive to 
engage in tax evasion as they own the cash flow that they control. The separation of 12 
ownership and control (typical of larger firms) reduces the importance of this incentive. 
Besides, in large firms generally there is a higher degree of accountability and more 
checks and balances; in these firms the formally paid wages are more likely to reflect the 
actual remuneration of labour. 
 
One indirect piece of evidence in support of this hypothesis was the introduction in 2003 
(as part of the on-going pension reform) of lower limits (“insurance thresholds”) for the 
minimum payroll contributions to the social security system. The previous system related 
compulsory social security contributions to reported (formally paid) wages. Among the 
openly stated reasons for the introduction of this change was the perception of massive tax 
evasion in the payment of compulsory social security contributions. Hence by introducing 
the insurance thresholds the government was hoping to be able to reduce the level of tax 
evasion at least with respect to the payroll taxes. 
 
Our main underlying hypothesis thus is that, due to tax evasion, small private firms likely 
underreport the level of labour remuneration, that is, the wages actually paid are higher 
than those officially reported. To be able to pay such wages, obviously these firms should 
also have additional, unreported revenue (sales), on top of what is actually reported in their 
books. As a result, the actual value added generated by these firms will also be higher than 
what is officially reported. In what follows we attempt a rough estimate of the degree of 
such underreporting. 
 
What would be the implication if our hypothesis were true? As shown, below, on the basis 
of some additional assumptions, it could be possible to draw some inferences about 
possible underreporting of activity within the reported enterprise balance sheets such as 
the actual wage levels/labour costs (vis-à-vis reported levels which are possibly 
underreported) and, as a result, about the corresponding underreporting of the level of 
sales and value added produced by these firms. However, admittedly, this approach would 
not help to identify all informal activities that are not reported in the company books. E.g. 
no inferences can be drawn about unreported sales that are not allocated as wages but 
contribute to retained earnings, or about unrecorded labour input (activity in the informal 
economy). Hence our approach only offers a partial solution to the measurement of one 
part of the informal economy. 
 
What could be the possible approach for a rough evaluation of the level of underreporting 
(that is, to measure, or guesstimate, the size of this grey sector)? Any such approach 
would have to be based on a specific model of wage formation in the suspected category 
of firms (small domestically controlled private firms), defining wages as a function of some 
observable variables of firm performance (the latter is essential for the practical 
implementation). In what follows we suggest and quantify three possible approaches, 
based on alternative assumptions about wage formation. 13 
 
1. One plausible hypothesis could be that of the identicalness (or similarity) of cost 
structures across similar firms. This hypothesis is equivalent to the assumption of efficient 
factor and product markets, pressing firms that compete in the same markets to use 
identical (or similar) production technologies; in turn, this would lead to identical (or similar) 
levels of productive efficiency. As a result, their cost structures would also be identical (or 
similar). We could then take the observed cost structure of a reference sub-sample (which 
is presumably non-distorted) and use it to recover the actual cost structure of the sub-
sample with suspected distortions (the small domestically owned private firms). 
 
2. Alternatively, one could hypothesize wage equalization for employees with similar skills 
in similar types of firms. This hypothesis is equivalent to the assumption of an efficient and 
competitive job market where firms are pressed to offer competitive wages to workers of 
similar skills. Accordingly, we could take the reported wage levels in a reference sub-
sample (which are presumably non-distorted) and use them as the actual wage levels for 
the sub-sample with suspected distortions (the small domestically owned private firms). 
 
3. Finally one might also hypothesize similarity of the pattern of wage formation in firms 
characterized by similar governance structures.  In a simplified version based on two types 
of governance structures (SOEs and private firms) this hypothesis is equivalent to the 
assumption that the model of wage formation (wage in relation to some key performance 
characteristics) in each of these categories is identical. We could then estimate a wage 
equation on the basis of a reference sub-sample (in which reported wages are presumably 
non-distorted) and use it to model wage formation in the sub-sample w ith suspected 
distortions (the small domestically owned private firms). The actual wage levels in the latter 
will be computed through simulation. 
 
 
3.2 Empirical results 
In this section we present quantitative estimations of the level of underreporting on wages 
and value added on the basis of the three approaches outlined above. In order to apply 
any of these approaches, we have to choose a reference sample of firms where we 
assume that reported wages are realistic and non-distorted, and from there, to make the 
corresponding adjustments to the level of wages in the small domestically owned private 
firms (those with less than 20 employees) which are our main suspect for underreporting. 
 
For the first two approaches our choice of such a reference sample is that of small SOEs. 
While this may at first glance appear as a dubious choice, there are several arguments to 
support it. First, as noted, managers of SOEs do not have equally strong incentives to 
avoid taxes as they do not own the cash flow. Secondly, SOEs are subject to much stricter 
regulation by policy (including wage formation) and usually there is some degree of public 14 
control over the books of such firms. There is, however, one practical problem in selecting 
a sub-sample that is fully matching in size: as there are only very few SOEs with less than 
20 employees, we have taken as a reference sub-sample the group of SOEs with less than 
100 employees. 
 
In applying the first approach, we assume similarity of the cost structures in the two 
categories: “Domestically controlled de novo private firms with less than 20 employees” 
and “SOEs with less than 100 employees”. More specifically, we assume that the ratio of 
wage costs to capital costs in these two categories of firms is the same within single-digit 
NACE sections. In applying the second approach we assume that the average wages in 
the category “Domestically controlled de novo private firms with less than 20 employees” 
are the same as those in “SOEs with less than 100 employees”, again within single-digit 
NACE sections. 
 
Some quantitative results of this exercise are reported in tables 9 and 10. Table 9 reports 
the cost structures that result from applying the above assumption. As can be seen, this 
yields much higher shares of wage costs in the total costs of small domestic private firms 
than originally reported. Note, however, that the resulting cost structures in the two 
categories of firms are not identical: in the adjusted cost stricture, wage costs of small 
domestic private firms occupy a higher share than in the case of small SOEs. This is 
because we only adjust wages but not payroll taxes in small private firms as the 
assumption is that they do pay extra wages in the grey zone but do not pay extra payroll 
taxes. 
 
(Table 9 here) 
 
Table 10 reports the average reported wages in small domestic private firms relative to the 
sector’s average and relative to the average for the reference sample (small SOEs) by 
single-digit NACE sections. When applying our second approach we assume that average 
wages in small private firms take the level of the corresponding small SOEs. Hence the 




(Table 10 here) 
 
For the application of the third approach, our choice of a reference sub-sample is that of 
foreign controlled firms with 20 or more employees. The rationale is the following. On the 
one hand, these are similar categories in terms of their governance and managerial 
                                                                 
7   Note that in the initial years wages in small domestic private firms are generally higher than those in small SOEs, i.e. for 
these years our hypothesis is not valid. Despite that, we have applied the same approach to these years as well, for the 
completeness of the exercise. 15 
incentive structures, something that could substantiate the assumption of similarity in the 
mechanism of wage formation in the two categories of firms. On the other hand, as argued 
above, due to the separation of ownership and control in larger firms (and, moreover, in the 
presence of foreign investors), the officially reported wage statistics in the firms of the 
reference sub-sample are less likely to be marred by distortions.  
 
For the application of the third approach we estimate a wage formation model on the basis 
of the sub-sample of foreign controlled firms with 20 or more employees (the reference 
sub-sample) for which we assume that there are no distortions in reported wage levels. We 
then assume that this mechanism of wage formation applies also to small domestically 
owned private firms. The next step is then to emulate wage formation in small domestically 
owned private firms on the basis of the estimated wage formation model.  
 
Regarding the actual model of wage formation, following Basu, Estrin and Svejnar (1997) 
our main hypothesis is that firm wages depend on enterprise characteristics as well as on 
some structural factors: 
 
(1)  wi = (Qi/Li, Oi) 
 
where wi is the average wage in firm i; Qi and L i are gross output (net sales) and total 
labour input (average number of employees) in firm i, respectively (hence Qi/Li is the firm’s 
labour productivity), and O i is a vector of relevant structural variables. While rather basic, 
this model in fact embeds different more elaborate models of wage formation (such as, e.g. 
the efficiency wage hypothesis, or profit sharing). 
 
The data presented in table 7 suggest that there is considerable cross-sectoral and cross-
regional variation in wage formation. While the cross-sectoral variation likely reflects 
differential productivity patterns (and hence will be captured by our specification), in order 
to control for the specific features of wage formation in the region of Sofia-city (which is 
systematically featured by higher average wages than other regions
8) we introduce a 
special dummy variable. So our final specification of the wage formation equation is: 
 
(2)  wi = ai0 + ai1 (Qi/Li) + ai2 DSi, + ei , 
 
where DSi is the dummy variable for Sofia-city (=1 for firms located in Sofia-city and 0 for all 
other firms). 
 
                                                                 
8   Apart from the capital Sofia, there is also additional variation across other regions. However, as the limited number of 
observations reduce the degrees of freedom, we try to keep the model as simple as possible. Due to this we only 
control for the region of Sofia as a structural factor of wage formation. 16 
Due to the ongoing major structural changes in the economy, structural relations are 
unstable and time-varying. For this purpose we prefer cross-section to panel estimations of 
the wage equation, i.e. we estimate this relation for each of the years between 1995 and 
2001. One additional advantage of using cross-section estimations is that in this case we 
do not need to be concerned about inflation and hence we can estimate the wage 
formation equation on the basis of nominal (current price), rather than real (constant price) 
data. 
 
The estimation results for the estimated wage formation equations in foreign controlled 
firms with 20 or more employees are shown in table 11. 
 
(Table 11 here) 
 
In accordance with the assumptions of our approach, we reckon that the same relationship 
holds for domestically controlled de novo private firms with less than 20 employees. Hence 
we can compute new wage levels in individual small domestic private firms by using the 
estimated equation (the error term will be omitted in this case). 
 
(3)  wj = a0 + a1 (Qj/Lj) + a2 DSj, 
 
This is basically a simulation exercise: we substitute the values of the corresponding 
variables (Qj/Lj) and DSj for each individual domestically controlled de novo private firm j 
with less than 20 employees in order to compute the corresponding wage level wj in that 
firm (for this purpose we use the corresponding equation for the same year).  Finally we 
compute new average wage levels in domestically controlled de novo private firm j with 
less than 20 employees by NACE sections, for each year between 1995 and 2001 (table 
12). 
 
(Table 12 here) 
 
In applying each of the three approaches we first compute alternative measures of wages 
and wage costs in each sector. Having done that, we can then make the corresponding 
adjustments to other performance variables such as value added and revenue (sales). As 
our assumptions is that the “extra” wages are paid on the bases of unreported revenue, we 
do that by simply adding the difference between estimated and reported wages to the 
sales, respectively, to value added. Some of these results representing the alternative 
measures of value added produced in each NACE sector are reported in table 13.  
 
(Table 13 here) 
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According to the first approach, in the years between 1996 and 2001
9 the value added 
produced in small domestic private firms was between 20% and 100% higher than actually 
reported. According to the second estimate, the corresponding figures were in the range 
between 30% and 50%. The results obtained from the third approach suggest differences 
between 40% and 60%. On average, the results produced by different approaches suggest 
a generally increasing level of underreporting over time. 
 
To assess the magnitude of these figures, we also provide an estimate of underreporting 
as percentage of the total value added produced in the whole corporate sector (that is the 
total “grey zone” economy, which is reported in the last two lines of table 13). According to 
the first approach in the last three years the “grey zone” economy was between 5% and 
10% (and increasing over time). In the second approach the corresponding range was 
between 3% and 4.5%. In the third approach, the “grey zone” economy is estimated in the 
range between 2.5% and some 5%. In any case, these numbers suggest a very significant 
level of underreporting of the level of economic activity for the economy as a whole. 
 
Our estimates of the grey zone economy compare favourably with some of the estimates 
made by the Bulgarian National Statistical Institute.  The Bulgarian statistics estimates the 
total share of the non-observed economy (which, as discussed, is a broader concept 
including underground production, informal activities and illegal activities) in 1998 and 1999 
at some 12% of GDP and in 2000 – at 16% of GDP (UNECE, 2003). Of this, the so called 
“economic underground” (which is the closest to, but probably somewhat broader than, our 
definition of the “grey zone” economy) in 1998 and 1999 accounts for some 5% of GDP 
and in 2000 – for 7.5% of GDP. Interestingly, the official estimate also suggest a surge in 
unobserved activity in the year 2000. 
 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
This paper deals with some aspects of the evolution and performance of the small private 
sector in Bulgaria focusing its effect on the Bulgarian labour market and on some of its 
“grey” business activity. 
 
The overall assessment of the evolution of the job market in the Bulgarian corporate sector 
indicates a high degree of turbulence and volatility with very intensive job flows, both in 
terms of job creation and job destruction.  This turbulence and volatility are especially 
pronounced in small private firms where both the rates of job creation and destruction are 
considerably higher than those in larger firms.  One of the unusual results is that the rates 
                                                                 
9   For 1995, the results for two of the approaches do not support our underlying hypothesis. This may indeed be due to 
the absence of underreporting in this year (see the arguments in the text) or may also statistical distortions due to the 
relatively small numbers of firms in our samples for that year.  18 
of job destruction in small private firms in some years exceed considerably the rates of job 
creation, which is most likely related to a very low survival rate of small Bulgarian firms. 
 
At the same time the empirical results presented in the paper indicate that small private 
firms do create net new jobs and are in fact among the most important generators of new 
jobs.  Our analysis, however, reveals that this is mostly due to extensive job creation in 
start-up businesses. 
 
In the second part of the paper we propose a methodology to measure some of the “grey” 
activity of Bulgarian small private firms. Our main hypothesis is that, due to tax evasion, 
small private firms likely underreport the level of remuneration while wages actually paid 
are higher than those reported. As such extra wages have to be paid from revenue, this 
implies that sales and value added generated by these firms should also be higher than 
actually reported. We propose different possible approaches for quantitative estimation of 
the level of underreporting based on different assumptions about wage formation in the 
economy such as: 1) similarity of cost structures in similar firms, 2) wage equalization for 
employees with similar skills and 3) similarity in the pattern of wage formation in firms with 
a similar governance structure.  
 
The three approaches are then tested on actual data for Bulgarian firms. According to the 
first approach in the years 1996-2001 the underreporting in proportion to total value added 
produced in the whole corporate sector (the “grey zone” economy) was between 5% and 
10% (and increasing over time). In the second approach the corresponding range was 
between 3% and 4.5%. In the third approach, the “grey zone” economy is estimated in the 
range between 2.5% and some 5%. These estimates of the size of grey zone economy 
compare favourably with some of the estimates of unobserved economic activity made by 







Basu, S., Estrin, S. and Svejnar, J. (1997), “Employment and Wage Behaviour of Industrial Enterprises in 
Transition Economies: The Cases of Poland and Czechoslovakia”, Economics of Transition, 5(2), pp. 271-287. 
Boeri, T. (1995), “Unemployment Dynamics and Labour Market Policies”, In: Commander, S. and Coricelli, F. 
(eds.)  Unemployment, Restructuring, and the Labour Market in Eastern Europe and Russia, Economic 
Development Institute Development Studies. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, pp. 361-383. 
Davis, S. J., Haltiwanger, J. and Schuh, S. (1993), “Small Business and Job Creation: Dissecting the Myth and 
Reassessing the Facts”, NBER Working Paper No. 4492. 
EBRD (1995), Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises, In: Transition Report 1995, London: European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development. 
Faggio, G. and Konings, J. (2003), “Job Creation, Job Destruction and Employment Growth in Transition 
Countries in the 90s”, Economic Systems, 27(2), pp. 129-54. 
Gerxhani, K. (1999), “Informal Sector in Developed and Less Developed Countries: A Literature Survey”, 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 99-083/2.  
Johnson, S., McMillan, J. and Woodruff, C. (2000), “Why do Firms Hide? Bribes and Unofficial Activity After 
Communism”, Journal of Public Economics, 76(3), pp. 495-520.  
Jurajda, S. and Terrell, K. (2003), “Job Growth in Early Transition: Comparing Two Paths”, Economics of 
Transition, 11(2), pp. 291-320. 
Jurajda, S. and Terrell, K. (2002), “What Drives the Speed of Job Reallocation During Episodes of Massive 
Adjustment?”, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Business School, WDI Working Papers 
No. 432. 
Haltiwanger, J. C. and Vodopivec, M. (2003), “Worker Flows, Job Flows and Firm Wage Policies: An Analysis of 
Slovenia”, Economics-of-Transition, 11(2), pp. 253-290. 
Haltiwanger, J. C. and Vodopivec, M. (2002), “Gross Worker and Job Flows in a Transition Economy: An 
Analysis of Estonia”, Labour Economics, 9(5), pp. 601-630. 
Hart, K. (1970), “Small Scale Entrepreneurs in Ghana and Development Planning”, Journal of Development 
Studies, 6(4), 104-120. 
Ihrig, J. and Moe, K. (2991), “Lurking in the Shadows: The Informal Sector and Government Policy”, mimeo. 
Konings, J., Lehmann, H. and  Schaffer, M.E. (1996), “Job Creation and Job Destruction in a Transition 
Economy: Ownership, Firm Size”, Centre for Economic Reform and Transformation, Heriot Watt University, 
CERT Discussion Papers No. 96/11. 
Schneider, F. (2002), “The Size and Development of the Shadow Economies of 22 Transition and 21 OECD 
Countries”, Institute for the Study of Labour (IZA), IZA Discussion Paper No. 514. 






Number of corporate entities in Bulgaria by NACE sections, ownership categories and regions 
  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
      I. Number of firms by NACE sections         
A. Agriculture, hunting and forestry  3345  3462  3643  3771  3917  3803  3937 
B. Fishing  21  29  27  35  38  38  48 
C. Mining and quarrying  89  109  120  125  145  165  165 
D. Manufacturing  4420  7463  8297  8999  10163  10917  11775 
E. Electricity, gas and water supply  79  103  106  95  116  145  165 
F. Construction  1597  3108  3299  3814  4498  4818  5222 
G. Wholesale and retail trade; repair  6240  15956  19394  23086  28011  30309  32760 
H. Hotels and restaurants  391  793  890  1269  1882  2363  2658 
I. Transport, storage and communication  703  1797  2129  2472  3137  3677  4333 
J. Financial intermediation  109  230  210  236  843  1103  915 
K. Real estate, renting and business activity  1676  3442  4306  5751  7529  9241  10436 
M. Education  82  119  127  165  268  351  393 
N. Health and social work  50  69  89  143  261  1268  1515 
O. Other community, social and personal service  560  779  868  801  1158  1303  1496 
      II. Number of firms by ownership categories               
SOEs  5363  5322  3890  3242  2714  2810  2408 
Firms privatized to domestic investors  550  156  1016  305  518  300  364 
Domestically controlled de novo private firms with 20 or more employees  2658  3453  4379  5952  6351  6988  7614 
Foreign controlled firms with 20 or more employees  61  147  319  452  590  710  818 
Domestically controlled de novo private firms with less than 20 employees  10478  26418  31410  37731  48148  54748  60584 
Foreign controlled private firms with less than 20 employees  257  1964  2491  3080  3646  3945  4031 
      III. Number of firms by regions               
North-West  945  1055  1339  1522  1726  2069  2288 
North-Central  2565  4919  6292  6880  8305  9230  10420 
North-East  2479  4267  5087  6391  9244  10897  12041 
South-East  1411  2340  2779  3131  3769  4164  4921 
South-Central  3680  9643  10750  11533  13069  14017  14372 
South-West  1378  3273  3279  3995  4688  5058  5584 
Sofia-city  6909  11963  13979  17221  20531  24066  26193 
      All firms  19367  37460  43505  50762  61967  69501  75819 
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Table 2 
Breakdown of employment in the Bulgarian corporate sector by NACE sections, ownership categories and regions (% of total) 
  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
      I. Breakdown by NACE sections         
A. Agriculture, hunting and forestry  9.1  8.0  8.2  7.9  7.2  6.2  5.2 
B. Fishing  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
C. Mining and quarrying  4.4  4.8  4.7  4.7  3.8  3.1  2.8 
D. Manufacturing  47.4  44.8  41.9  43.2  41.0  37.1  35.6 
E. Electricity, gas and water supply  4.0  4.2  4.4  4.2  5.1  5.2  4.7 
F. Construction  8.1  7.7  7.8  7.4  7.6  6.6  6.6 
G. Wholesale and retail trade; repair  7.9  9.4  10.9  11.7  13.1  14.0  15.5 
H. Hotels and restaurants  1.7  1.8  2.0  2.0  2.2  2.3  2.4 
I. Transport, storage and communication  12.9  14.2  14.0  12.1  12.7  11.3  10.3 
J. Financial intermediation  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.3  0.3  0.6  1.6 
K. Real estate, renting and business activity  2.9  3.3  4.0  4.3  5.0  6.5  7.5 
M. Education  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.2  0.5  0.4 
N. Health and social work  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1  0.1  4.8  5.3 
O. Other community, social and personal service  1.4  1.5  1.7  1.9  1.7  1.9  2.0 
      II. Breakdown by ownership categories of firms               
SOEs  78.5  72.8  51.8  45.2  35.2  30.5  25.7 
Firms privatized to domestic investors  2.2  1.3  13.1  2.2  5.0  3.0  2.2 
Domestically controlled de novo private firms with 20 or more employees  15.2  17.6  22.4  36.2  37.5  41.2  45.3 
Foreign controlled firms with 20 or more employees  0.8  1.8  3.5  4.8  7.2  8.0  8.4 
Domestically controlled de novo private firms with less than 20 employees  3.2  6.2  8.8  10.9  14.3  16.4  17.4 
Foreign controlled private firms with less than 20 employees  0.1  0.3  0.5  0.6  0.9  1.0  1.0 
      III. Breakdown by regions               
North-West  5.3  5.0  4.9  4.6  4.5  4.3  4.2 
North-Central  14.9  14.4  13.4  13.8  13.9  13.8  13.4 
North-East  13.0  13.0  12.7  13.0  13.2  13.1  12.9 
South-East  10.0  9.9  9.6  9.9  10.1  9.9  10.0 
South-Central  21.9  22.3  21.4  22.3  21.6  21.0  20.6 
South-West  8.3  8.3  7.9  7.9  7.8  7.6  7.3 
Sofia-city  26.5  27.0  30.1  28.5  28.9  30.3  31.6 
Total number of employed persons (ths.)  1450.4  1612.6  1534.8  1550.0  1477.3  1475.6  1523.8 
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Table 3 
Average number of employed persons in Bulgarian firms by NACE sections, ownership categories and regions 
  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
      I. By NACE sections               
A. Agriculture, hunting and forestry  40  37  34  33  27  24  20 
B. Fishing  22  16  16  17  10  9  9 
C. Mining and quarrying  719  710  596  578  383  279  261 
D. Manufacturing  155  97  78  74  60  50  46 
E. Electricity, gas and water supply  727  664  642  684  656  532  435 
F. Construction  74  40  36  30  25  20  19 
G. Wholesale and retail trade; repair  18  9  9  8  7  7  7 
H. Hotels and restaurants  62  37  35  24  17  15  14 
I. Transport, storage and communication  267  127  101  76  60  45  36 
J. Financial intermediation  9  8  9  17  5  7  26 
K. Real estate, renting and business activity  25  15  14  12  10  10  11 
M. Education  16  28  26  24  13  20  16 
N. Health and social work  12  11  11  10  6  55  53 
O. Other community, social and personal service  37  31  30  37  21  21  21 
      II. By ownership categories of firms               
SOEs  212  221  204  216  191  160  163 
Firms privatized to domestic investors  57  132  198  112  143  146  90 
Domestically controlled de novo private firms with 20 or more employees  71  59  63  83  81  78  81 
Foreign controlled firms with 20 or more employees  166  106  139  147  175  155  146 
Domestically controlled de novo private firms with less than 20 employees  5  4  4  5  4  4  4 
Foreign controlled private firms with less than 20 employees  3  2  3  3  3  4  4 
      III. By regions               
North-West  81  76  56  46  38  31  28 
North-Central  84  47  33  31  25  22  20 
North-East  76  49  38  31  21  18  16 
South-East  103  69  53  49  40  35  31 
South-Central  86  37  31  30  24  22  22 
South-West  88  41  37  31  24  22  20 
Sofia-city  56  36  33  26  21  19  18 
      All firms  75  43  35  31  24  21  20 
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Table 4 
Rates of gross job creation and destruction in existing firms by NACE sections, ownership categories and regions (%) 
  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 




























      I. By NACE sections                         
A. Agriculture, hunting and forestry   11.7  -25.8  11.9  -13.6  12.1  -15.2  10.6  -10.6  11.0  -23.9  9.4  -23.9  9.0  -23.0 
B. Fishing  9.0  -4.9  2.1  -13.2  9.8  -32.1  12.7  -4.3  4.5  -28.1  9.7  -23.0  19.4  -13.3 
C. Mining and quarrying  0.9  -5.5  5.4  -3.6  1.5  -10.1  1.2  -9.3  1.6  -14.4  4.4  -14.2  4.0  -7.9 
D. Manufacturing  2.9  -6.4  5.4  -7.2  5.1  -12.1  7.7  -9.3  5.7  -17.2  7.8  -18.5  9.1  -12.4 
E. Electricity, gas and water supply  1.9  -0.2  2.1  -0.5  1.1  -1.1  1.8  -1.8  0.4  -1.1  3.8  -15.5  8.6  -12.9 
F. Construction  4.1  -13.2  9.0  -22.4  5.2  -19.9  11.2  -20.0  10.0  -19.5  11.9  -17.4  14.4  -15.1 
G. Wholesale and retail trade  2.6  -11.7  16.3  -8.3  7.5  -13.2  11.8  -8.8  13.2  -15.1  16.3  -12.6  17.3  -10.8 
H. Hotels and restaurants  7.1  -17.8  13.1  -9.5  11.0  -17.6  8.7  -7.1  9.8  -18.3  13.8  -14.6  13.8  -12.2 
I. Transport, communication  0.4  -5.1  2.9  -2.5  1.6  -6.3  3.5  -18.0  4.4  -11.9  3.9  -14.2  4.1  -14.3 
J. Financial intermediation  0.3  -0.7  11.3  -0.6  5.2  -6.9  7.1  -3.5  50.5  -15.5  42.1  -10.7  81.2  -3.9 
K. Real estate, renting   6.4  -10.9  19.4  -8.3  15.2  -15.4  16.0  -24.8  18.6  -31.3  26.6  -10.6  19.5  -16.7 
M. Education  4.5  -9.8  20.5  -3.2  8.1  -19.2  10.8  -5.9  31.3  -19.9  38.5  -7.5  22.0  -28.4 
N. Health and social work  5.4  -4.2  6.6  -5.0  2.4  -7.6  12.8  0.6  9.8  -36.2  1.0  -0.4  13.1  -15.2 
O. Other community, social service  7.5  -9.5  9.9  -7.7  9.4  -15.8  14.0  -9.0  17.0  -20.9  19.5  -10.9  14.4  -12.6 
      II. By ownership categories                                    
SOEs  3.1  -8.7  3.6  -7.6  2.5  -10.0  3.3  -12.5  2.7  -14.6  2.7  -16.5  8.5  -14.6 
Firms privatized to dom. investors  4.8  -35.5  13.0  -12.8  2.8  -19.4  6.1  -34.7  3.4  -19.3  3.3  -18.5  5.9  -17.4 
Domestic de novo private with L>20  6.1  -6.0  16.9  -7.4  12.7  -10.0  11.7  -9.5  10.3  -14.5  13.3  -13.1  13.8  -10.0 
Foreign controlled firms with L>20   4.4  -1.7  31.1  -2.6  11.4  -7.6  15.5  -4.8  10.8  -11.1  13.9  -11.0  20.1  -8.0 
Domestic de novo private with L<20  4.7  -15.9  14.7  -14.0  8.3  -20.3  12.1  -13.3  13.8  -29.0  15.6  -20.7  14.5  -21.4 
Foreign controlled firms with L<20  2.1  -5.1  30.4  -5.1  7.5  -10.3  14.2  -4.9  12.2  -28.6  18.1  -17.7  17.3  -24.0 
      III. By regions                                    
North-West  3.9  -8.6  4.7  -7.1  5.9  -12.5  5.8  -10.9  5.3  -15.9  5.9  -22.7  12.0  -11.4 
North-Central  3.9  -8.9  4.0  -9.5  7.0  -15.1  9.2  -8.0  7.3  -15.0  9.3  -15.4  9.5  -12.8 
North-East  4.5  -11.0  6.9  -8.3  6.7  -13.6  7.5  -9.3  6.0  -18.8  8.9  -18.3  12.7  -12.6 
South-East  4.2  -7.4  4.8  -6.5  6.0  -11.3  7.1  -7.1  6.1  -16.6  10.3  -15.6  9.9  -12.3 
South-Central  3.7  -9.9  5.2  -9.3  7.8  -12.7  8.0  -10.8  7.4  -16.7  8.7  -15.6  10.7  -12.8 
South-West  4.4  -11.0  5.0  -9.3  5.5  -18.4  9.5  -10.1  9.8  -16.1  8.3  -16.2  9.7  -13.9 
Sofia-city  2.2  -7.2  13.7  -6.0  3.4  -8.0  11.1  -18.3  10.0  -17.1  13.4  -12.7  17.6  -14.5 
      All firms  3.6  -9.0  7.5  -7.9  5.8  -12.0  8.7  -11.4  7.9  -16.7  10.2  -15.4  12.9  -13.3 
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Table 5 
Share of firms with growing employment from previous year by NACE sections, ownership and regions (% of corresponding category) 
  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
      I. By NACE sections         
A. Agriculture, hunting and forestry  30.2  37.6  35.6  31.5  24.3  24.0  25.3 
B. Fishing  28.6  9.5  24.1  37.0  14.3  23.7  36.8 
C. Mining and quarrying  37.8  41.6  21.1  25.0  17.6  33.8  35.2 
D. Manufacturing  30.0  34.6  21.1  30.3  31.4  33.2  36.5 
E. Electricity, gas and water supply  68.5  60.8  35.9  32.1  30.5  49.1  41.4 
F. Construction  25.4  32.4  14.5  29.1  30.7  30.2  30.7 
G. Wholesale and retail trade; repair  17.8  32.0  13.1  27.0  29.0  29.9  28.2 
H. Hotels and restaurants  29.2  26.6  14.2  24.3  27.5  31.4  28.7 
I. Transport, storage and communication  16.5  25.7  16.6  26.2  30.7  31.6  34.2 
J. Financial intermediation  33.3  26.6  7.4  0.0  14.0  28.6  25.7 
K. Real estate, renting and business activity  22.1  32.6  12.5  25.9  22.8  33.0  29.3 
M. Education  17.5  24.4  13.4  24.4  26.1  38.4  33.0 
N. Health and social work  30.8  22.0  7.2  32.6  25.9  39.1  35.6 
O. Other community, social and personal service  34.7  22.9  17.1  18.9  25.2  32.1  31.0 
      II. By ownership categories               
SOEs  n.a.  25.4  20.2  22.3  13.0  27.6  27.7 
Firms privatized to domestic investors  n.a.  40.0  23.7  42.0  35.7  43.1  33.3 
Domestically controlled de novo private firms with 20 or more employees  n.a.  29.5  23.3  28.9  27.6  31.4  37.6 
Foreign controlled firms with 20 or more employees  n.a.  43.8  27.1  46.3  43.6  48.0  50.3 
Domestically controlled de novo private firms with less than 20 employees  n.a.  37.9  15.8  27.6  30.2  30.7  29.1 
Foreign controlled private firms with less than 20 employees  n.a.  31.0  9.6  26.0  20.3  27.5  28.4 
      III. By regions               
North-West  29.3  31.1  25.4  28.3  26.4  27.8  29.7 
North-Central  27.8  28.4  22.7  29.9  30.8  30.3  29.9 
North-East  29.3  33.9  23.8  27.8  29.4  29.9  29.8 
South-East  23.5  29.5  23.3  27.5  30.9  28.8  32.6 
South-Central  24.7  29.1  19.7  26.0  27.0  30.0  28.8 
South-West  32.5  32.1  21.0  27.9  30.1  28.3  31.6 
Sofia-city  24.8  37.9  7.6  27.8  27.3  33.9  30.8 
      All firms  27.3  33.1  17.2  27.7  28.3  30.8  30.2 
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Table 6 
Share of employment in start-up firms (created in current year) in the subset of firms with less than 20 employees by NACE sections, 
ownership and regions (% of employment in corresponding category) 
  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
      I. By NACE sections         
A. Agriculture, hunting and forestry  21.0  15.7  10.7  10.0  9.1  8.5  6.5 
B. Fishing  39.7  44.1  14.2  33.3  23.6  9.5  17.2 
C. Mining and quarrying  32.4  40.3  16.6  32.9  16.6  19.9  8.9 
D. Manufacturing  57.9  46.1  24.5  23.9  19.1  14.5  11.9 
E. Electricity, gas and water supply  24.0  51.7  24.2  6.8  19.2  17.1  15.6 
F. Construction  77.0  79.6  25.6  27.3  21.1  13.6  11.7 
G. Wholesale and retail trade; repair  50.8  50.7  29.1  29.2  23.0  15.4  13.8 
H. Hotels and restaurants  59.1  65.9  36.1  40.4  40.9  24.8  20.7 
I. Transport, storage and communication  87.8  79.3  30.8  31.5  24.8  20.0  16.7 
J. Financial intermediation  88.0  n.a.  37.6  78.6  34.0  27.7  14.9 
K. Real estate, renting and business activity  57.3  77.4  29.3  33.7  28.0  21.1  14.9 
M. Education  23.5  62.3  19.1  41.2  44.1  27.7  15.9 
N. Health and social work  66.6  61.5  27.9  40.5  38.3  69.5  22.3 
O. Other community, social and personal service  30.6  56.8  27.7  36.3  29.7  23.0  17.3 
      II. By ownership categories                      
Domestically controlled de novo private firms with less than 20 employees  44.5  48.8  25.8  26.7  21.9  16.6  13.5 
Foreign controlled private firms with less than 20 employees  68.8  90.2  29.4  33.3  25.9  24.2  16.1 
      III. By regions               
North-West  27.0  17.6  23.2  21.0  18.7  23.7  14.1 
North-Central  39.0  46.4  26.4  23.2  20.5  15.0  13.2 
North-East  37.0  38.3  26.5  29.2  30.2  17.5  13.4 
South-East  43.6  45.4  28.7  28.7  22.9  19.2  19.0 
South-Central  59.9  55.7  25.1  24.1  19.0  16.0  12.9 
South-West  35.2  59.1  19.6  27.6  19.4  16.1  13.4 
Sofia-city  60.9  79.6  27.7  30.6  22.4  17.4  13.4 
      All firms  44.9  50.0  26.0  27.3  22.6  17.0  13.6 
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Table 7 
Average wage by NACE sections, ownership categories and regions relative to the sample average (all firms = 1.0) 
  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
      I. By NACE sections         
A. Agriculture, hunting and forestry  0.73  0.68  0.76  1.02  0.76  0.78  0.73 
B. Fishing  0.57  0.53  0.58  0.56  0.46  0.48  0.44 
C. Mining and quarrying  1.34  1.36  1.48  1.35  1.57  1.84  1.78 
D. Manufacturing  0.96  0.98  0.98  1.09  0.95  1.02  0.96 
E. Electricity, gas and water supply  1.28  1.53  1.78  0.65  1.98  1.71  1.78 
F. Construction  1.16  1.26  1.22  1.40  1.11  1.04  0.96 
G. Wholesale and retail trade; repair  0.99  0.85  0.68  0.84  0.68  0.72  0.68 
H. Hotels and restaurants  1.16  1.02  0.80  0.90  0.77  0.72  0.70 
I. Transport, storage and communication  1.06  1.02  1.11  0.74  1.14  1.28  1.65 
J. Financial intermediation  1.17  0.53  0.58  0.21  ..  0.66  0.30 
K. Real estate, renting and business activity  0.92  0.77  0.60  0.84  0.82  0.78  0.79 
M. Education  1.01  1.43  1.58  0.49  1.05  0.63  0.61 
N. Health and social work  0.80  0.75  0.64  0.53  0.66  0.51  0.93 
O. Other community, social and personal service  0.83  0.65  0.56  0.64  0.74  0.79  0.73 
      II. By ownership categories               
SOEs  1.06  1.11  1.27  1.06  1.34  1.30  1.55 
Firms privatized to domestic investors  1.13  0.69  0.95  2.00  1.14  1.19  0.95 
Domestically controlled de novo private firms with 20 or more employees  0.56  0.69  0.61  0.95  0.79  0.88  0.83 
Foreign controlled firms with 20 or more employees  0.97  1.01  1.10  1.37  1.35  1.49  1.31 
Domestically controlled de novo private firms with less than 20 employees  1.58  0.63  0.42  0.58  0.49  0.47  0.47 
Foreign controlled private firms with less than 20 employees  2.94  1.45  0.72  0.97  0.99  0.94  0.99 
      III. By regions               
North-West  0.81  0.97  0.99  0.97  1.02  1.09  1.06 
North-Central  0.81  0.80  0.77  1.01  0.84  0.89  0.84 
North-East  0.96  0.97  0.96  1.04  0.90  0.90  0.89 
South-East  0.92  0.96  0.98  1.08  0.88  0.93  0.87 
South-Central  0.89  0.91  1.01  1.03  0.94  0.94  0.94 
South-West  1.07  1.06  1.04  0.95  1.01  0.99  0.95 
Sofia-city  1.26  1.20  1.11  0.94  1.20  1.14  1.19 
      All firms  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
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Table 8 
Average labour productivity (sales per employee) in firms by NACE sections, ownership categories and regions, average for all firms=1.0 
  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
      I. By NACE sections         
A. Agriculture, hunting and forestry  0.48  0.42  0.51  0.57  0.43  0.43  0.45 
B. Fishing  2.74  1.96  0.41  0.38  0.36  0.44  0.59 
C. Mining and quarrying  0.66  0.66  0.71  0.57  0.66  0.71  0.68 
D. Manufacturing  1.00  0.91  0.90  0.79  0.70  0.76  0.66 
E. Electricity, gas and water supply  1.23  1.68  1.86  0.46  1.65  1.48  1.87 
F. Construction  0.58  0.48  0.50  0.77  0.73  0.69  0.75 
G. Wholesale and retail trade; repair  3.02  3.34  2.97  3.53  2.95  2.98  2.84 
H. Hotels and restaurants  0.61  0.54  0.43  0.54  0.48  0.42  0.47 
I. Transport, storage and communication  0.67  0.56  0.57  0.48  0.66  0.71  0.85 
J. Financial intermediation  1.54  0.43  0.31  0.11  ..  0.54  0.14 
K. Real estate, renting and business activity  0.46  0.36  0.28  0.50  0.51  0.39  0.41 
M. Education  0.35  0.31  0.30  0.18  0.33  0.15  0.16 
N. Health and social work  0.26  0.16  0.19  0.21  0.24  0.07  0.13 
O. Other community, social and personal service  0.36  0.28  0.23  0.34  0.44  0.41  0.39 
      II. By ownership categories               
SOEs  0.93  0.92  1.02  0.67  0.76  0.67  0.79 
Firms privatized to domestic investors  0.91  1.02  0.61  1.02  0.86  0.64  0.56 
Domestically controlled de novo private firms with 20 or more employees  0.61  0.78  0.77  0.90  0.72  0.77  0.78 
Foreign controlled firms with 20 or more employees  1.17  2.06  1.76  1.81  2.02  2.28  1.87 
Domestically controlled de novo private firms with less than 20 employees  4.33  2.11  1.66  2.21  1.75  1.57  1.44 
Foreign controlled private firms with less than 20 employees  11.14  3.94  2.68  3.33  2.47  2.33  2.29 
      III. By regions               
North-West  0.69  0.70  0.65  0.63  0.67  0.73  0.68 
North-Central  0.78  0.79  0.76  0.92  0.81  0.76  0.75 
North-East  0.96  0.98  1.07  1.05  1.00  0.98  1.00 
South-East  0.75  0.69  0.72  0.78  0.62  0.65  0.63 
South-Central  0.77  0.80  0.88  0.88  0.82  0.74  0.78 
South-West  1.42  1.79  1.68  1.09  1.40  1.52  1.00 
Sofia-city  1.36  1.22  1.13  1.22  1.30  1.32  1.41 
      All firms  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
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Table 9 
Share of wage costs in total costs (value added definition of output)  
by NACE sections in small private firms and in a reference sample (small SOEs) 
NACE sections  1995  1996 1997  1998  1999  2000 2001 
 Small SOEs  44.8  58.5 46.0  60.7  60.0  62.7 63.7 
 Small private, reported  55.4  50.6 71.0  60.8  53.4  51.9 48.9  A. Agriculture, hunting 
and forestry   Small private, adjusted  44.3  71.3 73.2  74.0  73.5  72.9 76.6 
 Small SOEs  29.7  55.9 31.7  54.3  57.1  62.7 51.4 
 Small private, reported  37.9  44.9 43.4  48.3  37.2  41.1 34.3 
B. Fishing   Small private, adjusted  26.8  72.2 69.5  66.5  67.6  74.1 58.2 
 Small SOEs  46.6  53.7 32.1  56.7  56.7  58.1 57.2 
 Small private, reported  45.6  29.9 59.4  59.3  51.1  39.2 47.5 
C. Mining and quarrying   Small private, adjusted  47.5  66.8 56.2  69.0  65.4  68.9 65.2 
 Small SOEs  43.1  44.7 60.4  53.4  51.2  47.6 45.0 
 Small private, reported  47.9  41.0 64.1  53.5  50.1  46.9 44.7 
D. Manufacturing   Small private, adjusted  44.1  48.3 65.9  58.8  56.9  50.2 47.9 
 Small SOEs  56.0  55.2 52.1  53.8  50.8  48.0 44.8 
 Small private, reported  58.9  60.6 41.2  57.6  66.2  63.5 56.9  E. Electricity, gas and 
water supply   Small private, adjusted  73.0  73.7 52.7  65.7  69.0  64.8 58.6 
 Small SOEs  60.6  63.4 26.1  35.6  42.3  56.3 54.8 
 Small private, reported  64.1  53.8 54.3  60.3  55.4  57.9 52.9 
F. Construction   Small private, adjusted  67.4  59.7 52.4  56.6  60.6  61.0 67.8 
 Small SOEs  37.3  46.3 42.4  55.2  58.6  60.9 61.7 
 Small private, reported  31.7  25.6 51.0  49.3  46.0  44.7 41.3  G. Wholesale and retail 
trade; repair   Small private, adjusted  39.1  54.6 63.3  66.4  73.4  75.0 78.3 
 Small SOEs  51.0  50.9 29.2  50.9  49.2  53.6 54.2 
 Small private, reported  35.7  43.7 54.3  49.9  37.8  37.9 35.7 
H. Hotels and restaurants  Small private, adjusted  58.1  70.0 54.5  52.2  59.2  65.4 68.3 
 Small SOEs  57.7  58.8 17.6  57.3  57.0  61.8 71.9 
 Small private, reported  28.7  39.6 50.4  44.7  39.9  36.5 35.4  I. Transport, storage and 
communication   Small private, adjusted  72.1  71.2 66.1  74.5  75.0  78.8 76.6 
 Small SOEs  74.2  70.6 40.1  n.a  66.8  66.7 66.1 
 Small private, reported  12.4  20.8 33.7  52.1  54.9  55.4 57.0  J. Financial 
intermediation   Small private, adjusted  95.1  95.6 94.7  n.a  83.5  86.2 88.8 
 Small SOEs  54.6  63.3 25.3  48.1  58.0  57.8 56.3 
 Small private, reported  54.9  44.1 40.4  57.3  51.7  42.5 43.3  K. Real estate, renting 
and business activity    Small private, adjusted  60.0  79.3 73.0  67.4  73.0  69.7 67.7 
 Small SOEs  68.2  67.8 71.2  58.7  60.5  72.6 63.5 
 Small private, reported  78.6  77.3 74.7  70.7  66.1  65.2 65.7 
M. Education   Small private, adjusted  79.1  77.2 85.4  68.0  60.6  83.5 66.1 
 Small SOEs  67.3  49.3 52.7  61.0  63.6  67.9 67.4 
 Small private, reported  65.9  46.4 68.3  44.5  49.6  58.5 61.4 
N. Health and social work  Small private, adjusted  85.4  88.4 90.3  89.9  89.5  77.9 78.0 
 Small SOEs  64.8  65.9 57.9  62.5  62.1  64.5 63.5 
 Small private, reported  57.2  53.1 74.5  53.5  52.9  47.8 43.4 
O. Other community, , 
social and personal 
service   Small private, adjusted  80.1  83.0 83.4  78.9  81.9  82.4 79.9 
 Small SOEs  45.4  51.4 39.4  52.6  53.0  54.3 48.8 
 Small private, reported  41.6  37.3 56.0  53.5  48.9  46.5 43.9 





Average wage in small private firms relative to the sector’s average  
and the average for the reference sample (small SOEs) (corresponding reference = 1.0) 
Average wage in small private firms relative to:  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 2000  2001 
 Sectoral average wage   1.50  1.29  1.22  1.16  0.96 0.92  0.93  A. Agriculture, hunting 
and forestry   Average wage in small SOEs  1.22  0.93  0.83  1.11  0.91 0.96  0.88 
 Sectoral average wage   1.08  0.29  0.39  0.79  0.75 0.84  0.97 
B. Fishing   Average wage in small SOEs  1.09  0.25  0.34  0.64  0.43 0.56  0.56 
 Sectoral average wage   0.39  0.25  0.24  0.39  0.28 0.20  0.23 
C. Mining and quarrying   Average wage in small SOEs  0.70  0.38  0.48  0.62  0.47 0.36  0.43 
 Sectoral average wage   1.13  0.52  0.37  0.44  0.51 0.44  0.51 
D. Manufacturing   Average wage in small SOEs  1.08  0.50  0.47  0.47  0.38 0.31  0.31 
 Sectoral average wage   0.90  0.50  0.46  0.47  0.64 0.34  0.33  E. Electricity, gas and 
water supply   Average wage in small SOEs  0.93  0.50  0.45  0.62  0.85 0.38  0.34 
 Sectoral average wage   1.02  1.64  0.30  0.30  0.36 0.53  0.63 
F. Construction   Average wage in small SOEs  1.40  0.82  0.37  0.38  0.42 0.58  0.67 
 Sectoral average wage   1.15  0.66  0.54  0.56  0.58 0.59  0.61  G. Wholesale and retail 
trade; repair   Average wage in small SOEs  1.09  0.56  0.34  0.47  0.48 0.44  0.45 
 Sectoral average wage   0.83  0.32  0.30  0.32  0.38 0.44  0.49 
H. Hotels and restaurants   Average wage in small SOEs  0.87  0.39  0.39  0.34  0.24 0.28  0.30 
 Sectoral average wage   1.15  0.99  0.51  0.30  0.29 0.22  0.19  I. Transport, storage and 
communication   Average wage in small SOEs  1.49  1.17  0.53  0.58  0.56 0.55  0.60 
 Sectoral average wage   0.87  4.95  1.26  1.18  0.88 0.88  2.91  J. Financial 
intermediation   Average wage in small SOEs  1.42  1.69  1.17  n.a  0.96 0.53  0.52 
 Sectoral average wage   1.18  0.91  0.87  0.74  0.78 0.63  0.62  K. Real estate, renting 
and business activity    Average wage in small SOEs  1.37  0.76  0.58  0.39  0.48 0.35  0.38 
 Sectoral average wage   0.92  0.55  0.32  0.97  0.52 0.58  0.52 
M. Education   Average wage in small SOEs  1.54  0.91  0.67  0.62  0.62 0.52  0.48 
 Sectoral average wage   1.21  0.79  0.57  0.88  0.71 0.89  0.48 
N. Health and social work   Average wage in small SOEs  1.43  0.92  0.56  0.44  0.55 0.81  0.37 
 Sectoral average wage   1.75  1.04  1.13  0.55  0.67 0.56  0.56  O. Other community, 
social and personal 
service 
 Average wage in small SOEs  1.15  0.96  1.05  0.56  0.62 0.63  0.55 
 Sectoral average wage   1.15  0.81  0.45  0.48  0.47 0.44  0.45 
      All sectors   Average wage in small SOEs  1.19  0.69  0.48  0.52  0.46 0.46  0.41 
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Table 11 
Estimated equation of wage formation in foreign controlled firms  
with 20 or more employees 
Dependent variable: average annual nominal wage. Estimation method: OLS. 
  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
0.0178  0.0004  0.0008  0.0043  0.0027  0.0040  0.0023 
Labour productivity 
[5.48]***  [1.77]*  [2.15]**  [6.04]***  [6.02]***  [7.84]***  [8.83]*** 
0.052  0.232  1.244  1.668  2.502  2.830  3.187 
Dummy for Sofia-city 
[2.60]**  [6.74]***  [6.48]***  [6.48]***  [10.12]***  [9.26]***  [9.89]*** 
0.050  0.125  1.226  1.602  1.862  2.232  2.478 
Constant 
[5.73]***  [5.73]***  [9.45]***  [9.45]***  [11.73]***  [11.35]***  [11.80]*** 
Number of observations  78  246  384  516  628  754  875 
Adjusted R
2  0.435  0.160  0.105  0.172  0.190  0.174  0.181 
Note: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Table 12 
Average annual wage in small private firms: actual and simulated values, BGN 
Sector  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
  Actual  107  168  1687  2378  1978  2006  2023  A. Agriculture,  
hunting and forestry   Simulated  72  156  2037  2286  2061  2542  2707 
  Actual  58  29  415  885  960  1126  1264 
B. Fishing 
 Simulated  73  127  1543  1595  1894  2698  3113 
  Actual  61  67  759  1767  1438  1276  1515 
C. Mining and quarrying 
 Simulated  72  159  1913  3926  2703  3069  3595 
  Actual  110  96  663  1001  1310  1253  1475 
D. Manufacturing 
 Simulated  122  193  1806  2031  2694  3048  3353 
  Actual  116  150  1500  1513  2672  2542  2563  E. Electricity, gas and water 
supply   Simulated  144  270  2961  1401  2300  3201  3942 
  Actual  110  400  701  904  1167  1569  1831 
F. Construction 
 Simulated  86  800  2356  2154  2563  4209  2486 
  Actual  127  104  669  989  1107  1210  1260  G. Wholesale and retail 
trade; repair   Simulated  286  261  2295  2590  2805  3690  3672 
  Actual  95  59  432  623  770  928  1044 
H. Hotels and restaurants 
 Simulated  152  177  1665  1938  2276  3001  3344 
  Actual  125  194  1053  1219  1291  1309  1438  I. Transport, storage and 
communication   Simulated  182  369  3048  2845  2857  3537  3671 
  Actual  130  150  1161  1334  2885  1598  1815 
J. Financial intermediation 
 Simulated  130  355  2681  1909  3160  3197  3051 
  Actual  115  119  807  1205  1804  1323  1465  K. Real estate,  
renting and business activity   Simulated  127  282  2975  2581  3504  3346  3715 
  Actual  120  137  1001  1450  1554  1554  1481 
M. Education 
 Simulated  68  273  2158  2386  2542  3447  3543 
  Actual  100  113  582  857  1306  1259  1342 
N. Health and social work 
 Simulated  82  244  2352  1947  2735  1381  3072 
  Actual  154  125  1154  928  1394  1230  1221  O. Other community, , social 
and personal service   Simulated  174  205  2744  1654  2922  3501  3698 
  Actual  117  154  823  1150  1319  1322  1428 
      All sectors 
 Simulated  161  313  2262  2389  2756  3420  3438 
Note: In this exercise wage formation in small domestically owned private firms is emulated through the estimated 
equation for foreign controlled firms with 20 or more employees.  31 
Table 13 
Alternative assessment of value added produced in small private firms  
(corresponding reported value added = 1.0) and underreporting of total value added 
NACE sections  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
 Cost structure approach  0.87  1.37  1.03  1.65  2.37  2.28  2.58 
 Wage equalization  0.93  1.02  1.05  0.92  1.10  1.04  1.09 
A. Agriculture, hunting 
and forestry 
 Simulated wage formation  0.88  0.98  1.05  0.97  1.04  1.23  1.22 
 Cost structure approach  0.96  8.46  1.18  1.32  1.35  2.37  1.42 
 Wage equalization  0.99  1.66  1.18  1.16  1.18  1.34  1.20  B. Fishing 
 Simulated wage formation  1.03  1.75  1.25  1.23  1.13  1.62  1.37 
 Cost structure approach  1.06  2.09  0.97  1.22  1.33  1.83  1.37 
 Wage equalization  1.30  1.48  1.29  1.26  1.47  1.60  1.46  C. Mining and quarrying 
 Simulated wage formation  1.12  1.41  1.41  1.51  1.36  1.48  1.48 
 Cost structure approach  0.94  1.12  1.03  1.09  1.13  1.06  1.07 
 Wage equalization  0.79  1.34  1.41  1.41  1.71  1.98  2.10  D. Manufacturing 
 Simulated wage formation  0.84  1.34  1.63  1.38  1.45  1.64  1.63 
 Cost structure approach  8.97  11.42  0.82  1.58  3.97  2.02  2.12 
 Wage equalization  1.03  2.57  2.65  1.27  1.08  1.40  1.79 
E. Electricity, gas and 
water supply 
 Simulated wage formation  1.12  2.37  2.42  0.97  0.94  1.06  1.22 
 Cost structure approach  1.10  0.51  0.71  0.94  1.09  1.06  1.42 
 Wage equalization  0.50  1.74  1.91  1.65  1.54  1.33  1.24  F. Construction 
 Simulated wage formation  0.52  2.79  2.26  1.54  1.46  1.79  1.17 
 Cost structure approach  1.10  1.41  1.11  1.28  1.65  1.81  2.31 
 Wage equalization  0.90  1.13  1.33  1.31  1.31  1.39  1.40 
G. Wholesale and retail 
trade; repair 
 Simulated wage formation  1.11  1.24  1.41  1.44  1.45  1.61  1.61 
 Cost structure approach  1.74  22.17  1.01  1.03  1.46  1.71  2.43 
 Wage equalization  1.07  2.18  2.01  1.67  2.04  1.86  2.17 
H. Hotels and 
restaurants 
 Simulated wage formation  1.30  2.53  2.84  1.74  1.65  1.76  2.09 
 Cost structure approach  2.28  2.24  1.35  1.93  1.92  2.77  2.45 
 Wage equalization  0.85  0.94  1.34  1.26  1.20  1.27  1.20 
I. Transport, storage and 
communication 
 Simulated wage formation  0.95  1.40  1.73  1.48  1.32  1.55  1.45 
 Cost structure approach  41.63  n.a  17.00  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a 
 Wage equalization  0.83  n.a  0.93  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a 
J. Financial 
intermediation 
 Simulated wage formation  0.88  n.a  1.61  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a 
 Cost structure approach  1.13  2.93  2.88  1.28  1.64  1.73  1.64 
 Wage equalization  0.71  1.15  1.46  1.81  1.45  1.65  1.60 
K. Real estate, renting 
and business activity  
 Simulated wage formation  0.85  1.68  2.69  1.60  1.39  1.53  1.56 
 Cost structure approach  1.03  0.99  1.58  0.94  0.84  2.10  1.01 
 Wage equalization  0.36  1.11  1.71  2.05  1.44  1.83  2.02  M. Education 
 Simulated wage formation  0.33  1.81  1.67  1.31  1.47  1.79  1.89 
 Cost structure approach  2.58  3.75  2.58  4.31  4.20  1.76  1.60 
 Wage equalization  0.44  2.31  2.33  3.26  2.47  1.59  2.93 
N. Health and social 
work 
 Simulated wage formation  0.46  1.41  2.45  1.42  1.46  1.05  1.63 
 Cost structure approach  2.99  n.a  n.a  1.89  2.12  2.62  6.33 
 Wage equalization  0.71  n.a  n.a  2.50  2.49  2.32  1.22 
O. Other community, 
social and personal 
service   Simulated wage formation  1.12  n.a  n.a  1.31  1.41  1.73  3.59 
 Cost structure approach  1.74  1.71  1.20  1.31  1.63  1.83  2.11 
 Wage equalization  0.83  1.19  1.29  1.35  1.41  1.49  1.51        All sectors 
 Simulated wage formation  0.95  1.44  1.45  1.41  1.42  1.61  1.56 
 Cost structure approach  -4.9  -5.4  -1.1  -2.6  -5.2  -7.1  -9.5 
 Wage equalization  1.2  -1.5  -1.6  -3.0  -3.4  -4.3  -4.6 
Under/over-reporting  
(-/+) of total value added 
produced in all firms (%)  Simulated wage formation  0.3  -3.4  -2.4  -3.5  -3.5  -5.3  -5.1 
Note: In some cases (e.g. in sectors J and O), the reported figures on sectoral value added are negative; in these cases 
the corresponding ratios do not have a meaningful interpretation and are shown in the table as “n.a.” 
 